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Abstract. The article intends to analyse economic changes between advance and less-
developed countries and the issues of catching up. Our approach would be to analyse the 
evolution of developing countries (less-developed) in the world economy in a historical 
perspective. The important question for 21st century is whether the regions in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America would be able to catch or not? To answer this we need an understanding 
of both economics and history, which seems to be critical for a fuller picture on this issue. 
There have been on-going discussions about a sharp contrast in the international 
distribution of wealth between the rich (industrialised) and poor (primary producing) 
countries and it has been emphasised that the benefit of technical progress in the advanced 
economies would trickle down to the poor countries. The study finds that during the last 
three decades, there have been huge economic changes taking place globally and structural 
changes and patterns of trade have also taken place both in advance and developing 
countries. However, some developing countries have achieved faster growth rates than the 
advanced economies, particularly China, India, Indonesia and Turkey. However, they 
constitute a small numbers among the developing countries, but accounts large number of 
its population. The study concludes that most poor countries have not been able to 
converge, while largely the two largest ones, namely China and India have experienced 
rapid growth rates and economic changes in recent decades. 
Keywords. Global inequality, Catching-up, International trade. 
JEL. P45, O47. 
 
1. Introduction 
n recent years a number of studies have been published about the shift of 
balance of power from the West (US, Europe and Japan) to the East (China & 
India). (IMF, 2016; UN, 2011; Nayyar; 2013; Jacques, 2012; Rowthorn, 2008) 
The financial crisis in 2008 showed inherent weaknesses in the current 
international monetary system that contributed to global financial instability and 
soon after global economic crisis and a weak world economy. For developing 
countries, which rely heavily on international trade and foreign direct investment 
for growth and their economic development and the failure of the current global 
reserve system in ensuring sufficient international liquidity cause them to suffer 
from spill overs of global financial instability and economic crisis.  
The paper intends to critically examine the on-going discussions on global 
inequality, It is about the international distribution of wealth between the 
‘industrialised’ and ‘primary’ producing countries and it has been emphasised that 
the benefit of technical progress in the advanced economies would trickle down to 
the poor countries.   
The study intends to highlight similarities and differences between countries 
and divergences within diverse developing countries and to analyse catch up in 
terms of industrialization and development from a global macro perspective with a 
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focus on underlying economic factors. The aim of this paper is to examine 
economic changes between advanced and developing countries and the issues of 
catching up. Our approach would be to analyse the evolution of developing 
countries in the world economy in a historical perspective. The important question 
for 21st century is whether the regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America would be 
able to catch or not? To answer this we need an understanding of both economics 
and history, which seems to be critical for a fuller picture on this issue. 
Since their independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the developing countries 
share has risen and by 2014 their total share is over 44%, double than in the 1970. 
The industrial sector in the developing countries is also increasing and their share 
of value added in global manufacturing output increased from 13% in 1970 to more 
than 45% by 2014. However, the region wise the increase in manufacturing output 
was high unequally distributed. (IMF, 2016; Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2015) For 
instance, Latin America’s manufacturing share of global GDP has only marginally 
increased to 8% between 1970 and 2015, while for manufacturing share of Africa 
has remained the same i.e. less than 3% for this period. Africa’s share in 
manufacturing value added in 2015 was only 2%, as it was in 1970. (UNIDO, 
2016) As the Chinese economy is ‚catching up‛ fast and also the Indian economy, 
both are re-emerging as most rapid growing economies and also major contributors 
to overall world’s output growth in 21st century. China has become the second 
largest economy after the US, which is a remarkable development of the 21st 
century. (Jacques, 2012; Siddiqui, 2009) Moreover, the patterns of trade are 
changing as well. For example, the share of manufactures in developing countries 
exports rose from 12 % in 1980 to 64% by 2015, nearly half of this consisted of 
medium and high technology products. Another key development has been the rise 
of services in their export components of the developing courtiers such as 
information technology and e-commerce. Global income inequality could be 
measured in a number of ways such as: the first method of estimation adopted is 
inter-country inequality, which treats each country as individual and inequality 
measured is that of the distribution of per capita GDP among countries. The second 
method is supposed to be a little improved as it takes into account the population 
size of a country. The third estimation method takes into account the inequality of 
the world income distribution by combining inequality distribution in individual 
countries together with per capita income.  
Globalisation and inequality has been in discussion for long time among the 
economists. The reason for this continuing debate seems to be that of openness in 
trade and its effects on global inequality (Girdner & Siddiqui. 2008). Some studies 
have pointed out that growth of income inequalities both within and between 
countries are largely due to globalisation (Wood, 1998). Similar points have been 
made by John Pilger. He observes, ‚On the surface, it is instant financial trading, 
mobile phones, McDonald’s, Starbucks, holidays booked on the net. Behind this 
glass, it is the globalisation of poverty, a world where most human beings never 
make a phone call and live on less than two dollars a day, where 6,000 children die 
every day from diarrhoea because most have no access to clean water. In this 
world, unseen by most of us in the global north, a sophisticated system of plunder 
has forced more than ninety countries into ‘structural adjustment programmes’ 
since the eighties, widening the divide between rich and poor as never before. This 
is known as ‘nation building’ and ‘good governance’ by the ‘quad’ dominating the 
World Trade Organisation (US, Europe, Canada and Japan) and the Washington 
triumvirate (the World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury) that controls even 
minute aspects of government policy in developing countries. Their power derives 
largely from an unrepayable debt that forces the poorest countries to pay $ 100 
million to western creditors every day‛ (Pilger, 2002:2). He further observes, 
‚Promoting this are the transnational media corporations, American and European 
that own or manage the world’s principal sources of news and information‛ (Pilger, 
2002:3). 
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The methodology to be followed here is derived from the aims of the study and 
comparisons of international statistics provide the means of addressing the research 
questions and the meeting of objectives of this paper. The data are obtained from 
official sources and from international institutions such as the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund), World Bank and OECD.  
Section 1 presents an introduction on the topic. Section 2 discusses economic 
transformation in the colonies. Section 3 analyses the decline or economic 
convergence between the period of 1820 and 1950. Section 4 focuses on the 
theoretical debate. Section 5 examines the issue of free trade. Section 6 analyses 
globalisation and economic liberalism. Section 7 looks at catching-up. Finally 
section 8 concludes the findings. 
 
2. Economic transformation in the colonies 
There is no doubt that capitalism with rapid industrial growth laid foundation in 
the West, for higher and intensive production methods and increase productivity, 
which has provided us a possibility to achieve higher levels of incomes. However, 
by looking at capitalism today in a handful of advance economies does not present 
the full picture. The Eurocentric view does not include various factors which 
contributed towards the development of capitalism such as huge amount of capital 
accumulation, which came from slavery, plundering of territories and colonisation. 
For instance, the British rulers did not settle in India and they were only interested 
in transferring the wealth from India to support their own development of 
capitalism and industrialisation in Britain. Millions of Indian soldiers died to 
protect the British Empire with Indian money and materials (Siddiqui, 2017a). 
Most important question is what gave British state edge in the competition with 
other European powers, which helped the country to become a major industrial 
country. It was India, who not only provided British company with vast markets for 
their finished products and raw materials, but also with money and soldiers. As the 
19th century Conservative Party Prime Minister Lord Salisbury emphasised that 
India: ‚an English barrack in the oriental seas from which we may draw any 
number of troops without paying for them‛ (Quoted in Arrighi, 2007: 136). It was 
due to Indian soldiers that Britain was able to keep large presence in the Pacific 
Ocean during World War II in the campaign against Japan. 
The colonisation of the economies in Asia and Africa and Latin America in the 
late 18th and early 19th century put a break on the internally initiated progressive 
reforms and structural changes. It also imposed de-industrialisation, reoccurrences 
of famine and forced integration of their economies with the occupying powers. To 
strengthen their occupation various types of compromises were made with the pre-
capitalist and reactionary forces and the policies of ‘divide and rule’ which brought 
untold sufferings to the people in the colonies (Bagchi, 1984). 
Let us look at the pre-colonial economy. In 1750, prior to colonisation, India’s 
share of the world economy was 23% of the world’s total output. But nearly two 
centuries after British rule, it dropped to just 4% in 1947 (Maddison, 1998). 
Economic historians have agreed that India and China during the pre-colonial 
period were leading economies (Bagchi, 2010; Maddison, 2003). Moreover, 
Bairoch (1983) study indicates that in 1750, the income levels per capita in Europe 
were slightly lower than in South, while some others have suggested that in 1750 
the levels of development and per capita income between Europe and Asia were 
broadly similar and were not very different (Parthasarathi, 2011; Pomeranz, 2000: 
36-41). It is interesting to look beyond per capita income and to broad social 
indicators such as demographic indicators, life expectancy and literacy rate. The 
available evidence on life expectancy and birth rate were both similar in Europe 
and Asia in 1750. Life expectancy rose to 36 years in 1820, to 46 years in 1900 in 
Europe, while in the South remained lower i.e. 24 years in 1820 and 26 years in 
1900. (Bagchi, 2010; Bairoch, 1993) 
Moreover, the levels of industrialisation is important to examine not simply 
because it releases the overburdened agriculture but also facilitates development of 
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technology, raises productivity and also has spill over effects on the rest of the 
economy. Therefore, it is important to analyse this issue. During the 17th and 18th 
century, the world economy was characterised by a flow of manufactured goods 
from China and India to Europe and these goods were paid in silver and gold by 
European traders. Spices, cotton textiles from India and tea, porcelain and silk from 
China were exported to Europe (Frankopan. 2015). During the 19th century with the 
military defeat of India and China colonisation, which also coincided with 
industrial revolution in Britain, changed all this.  
Although European colonial expansion began much earlier in the 16th century 
by Spain and Portugal, who were looking for silver, spices, salves from Africa and 
Asia. Soon after plantation and mining were established in the colonies and 
encouraged to produce profitable commodities such as sugar, cotton, maize and 
tobacco and all under the control of European businesses (Siddiqui, 1989). The 
policy of ‘divide and rule’ was followed and people were increasingly divided 
between racial and colour, which inflated hate, prejudice and violence unknown in 
the past. At the same time all these business activities, along with forcibly taken 
huge amount of silver from Americas gave European unprecedented source of 
capital accumulation which was invested back in Europe and also paid for Chinese 
imports and military conflicts. Moreover, the mercantilism and expansion of trade 
had full state patronage. Imports of spices, textiles, tea, silk and porcelain from 
India and China were paid by silver and other precious metal looted from 
Americas. In the late 16th century the Dutch defeated Spain and Portugal, but 
finally in the 18th century the British navy emerged as a stronger power in Europe. 
England also extended full state protection to its merchant ships (Chang, 2002). 
During the 18th century with England the rapid economic transformation took 
place i.e. population depended on agriculture for their livelihood fell from 75% to 
35% in a very short period and importance of trade and manufacturing were 
growing both in terms of providing employment and income (Parthasarathi, 2011). 
Similar structural changes were observed in Netherlands, Belgium but at a much 
slower pace. A bit later and more modest decline of agriculture sector was 
observed in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In England the rapid structural 
change also meant rise in urbanisation and expansion of trade also led to increase 
in literacy and more commercialisation of agriculture (Saville, 1969). However, 
during the mid-18th century exports from China and India was rising and was very 
competitive like Europe as they had efficient market and stronger property rights 
(Parthasarathi, 2011). 
There seems to be more similarities between Asia and Western Europe in the 
mid-18th century than differences, when China and India together were able to 
contribute 50% of the world output (Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2015). Then question 
arises why Western Europe succeeded in industrial revolution not Asia. There 
seems to be a number of reasons. The shortages of wood in England followed by its 
deforestation compelled to the use of coal and state assistance was extended to 
spread use of technology in mining and also a number of policies were undertaken 
to protect infant industries such as woollen. The state protected domestic industries 
in its nascent stages (Chang, 2002). These active policy measures at domestic 
levels coincided with their military success overseas in 1688-1780. Finally, in 1757 
Siraj-u-Daulah, the last independent Nawab of Bengal was defeated in the Battle of 
Plassey. It offered big opportunity to British to systematic plunder and loot of 
Bengal (Siddiqui, 1990). 
British ruled in India from 1757 to 1947, during this period the income growth 
was negligible, and life expectancy declined. Moreover, during the second half of 
the nineteenth century per capita income had fallen in India by 50% (Hyndman, 
1919:22; Davis, 2001). This was the direct result of the colonial policy of 
imposition of monoculture cultivation of indigo and opium for the export to China, 
while tea, raw cotton and wheat to be exported to Britain. The land tax was raised 
to very high levels that led to small peasants abandoning subsistence agriculture 
such as rice cultivation for indigo and opium. In the wheat production, the market 
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forces determined the price; India continued to export wheat to Europe even during 
the famines (Davis, 2001). The opening of Suez Canal further reduced the transport 
costs, which boosted wheat exports from India, especially Punjab and Central 
Provinces and the export of wheat went up by 300% from 1875 to 1900 (Davis, 
2001:299). 
In fact, during the time of famines in India, there was no government initiative 
to help to distribute food to the starving people. Following the policy of laissez-
faire, the colonial government refused to provide any rescue package, while at the 
same time the Indian government mobilised resources to fund war in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, the so-called modernisation process during the colonial regime was 
slow and uneven sector and region wise (Siddiqui, 1989). Despite the limited 
economic changes it reinforced the pre-capitalist production relations in the 
economy. As a result, the total effect was in fact structural retrogression whereby 
the dynamic potential for accumulation and development otherwise associated with 
capitalism was systematically undermined. The encouragement of cultivation of 
export crops with the sole aim to benefit colonial regime, not the peasantry. The 
constant need for tribute and rising expenditure of colonial wars required 
constantly raising land revenue, which resulted in frequent occurrence of famines 
and large number of deaths in India (Davis, 2001; Siddiqui, 2014). The land 
revenue demand also became invariably ceased to adjust with fluctuations in 
output. British also imposed changes in land ownerships and property rights, which 
contributed to greater insecurity of peasantry and strengthened merchants-cum-
money lenders and absentee landlords. Regions in eastern India suffered most 
adverse effect of colonial rule. As Bagchi (1984) argues that: ‚India ceased to be a 
leading manufacturing country of the pre-capitalist era and was reduced to the 
position of a supplier of agricultural goods and raw materials to the industrialising 
economies of the West, particularly Britain... The long process of de-
industrialisation of India started with the catastrophic disappearance of cotton 
manufacturing from the list of exports of India...‛ (Bagchi, 1984:82). 
Frequent occurrences of Famines gave opportunity to money lenders and 
landlords to uproot peasants and acquire more land under their control. The 
phenomenon of absentee landowners taking over the ownership title from the 
peasants and converting them into debt bondage and tenancy was never witnessed 
in the past in India. As a result, a new parasitic stratum of absentee landowners 
arose, while the amount of rural indebtedness increased rapidly (Siddiqui, 2014). 
As Davis (2001) argues that, ‚the forcible incorporation of smallholder production 
into commodity and financial circuits controlled by overseas tended to undermine 
traditional food security. Recent scholarship confirms that it was subsistence 
adversity (high taxes, chronic indebtedness, inadequate acreage...), not 
entrepreneurial opportunity that typically promoted the turn to cash crop 
cultivation. Rural capital in turn tended to be parasitic rather than productive as 
rich landowners redeployed fortunes that they built during the export booms into 
usury [exorbitant rents] and crop brokerage... commercialization went hand in hand 
with pauperization without any silver lining of technical change or agrarian 
capitalism‛ (Davis, 2001:289-90). 
A similar situation was experienced in Egypt. For instance, during the 
Muhammad Ali regime between 1820 and 1840, Egypt attempted to modernise its 
economy through industrialisation. To finance it the country relied on external 
borrowings. The areas chosen to receive state subsidies were: the new strain of 
cotton seeds and credits to farmers who were willing to cultivate the new long 
strain cotton. The government was a monopoly buyer of raw cotton which 
encouraged nepotism and corruption. The government also built a number of textile 
industries, which focused on foreign markets and exports. Britain’s manufacturers 
saw this as a potential threat. To undermine such Egyptian policies, Britain 
encouraged Turkey to attack Egypt. Muhammad Ali also experienced internal 
challenges and opposition to his policies and as a result Ali’s was weakened (Cain, 
2006). Finally, as Kevan Harris (2016:5) argues that: Eventually, ‚[in 1840] British 
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and Austrian navies cut off Egyptian supply lines and entered Alexandria’s waters. 
Under duress, Ali signed series of capitulations which opened Egyptian markets, 
dismantled its manufacturing base and defanged its military. Egypt experienced 
rapid underdevelopment, becoming exporter of raw commodities and an importer 
of European manufacturers for the next century‛. Under pressure, Ali relented and 
granted free access to British manufactured products into Egyptian markets and 
European were also allowed to own land and resources in Egypt. As a result, Egypt 
was transferred into a supplier of raw materials rather than producers and exporter 
of industrial products (Siddiqui, 2015a; Cain, 2006). As Stavrianos (1981:221) 
argues that: ‚Under the protection of the capitulatory treaties [of war with Turkey 
and Britain] European speculator and adventurers were free to operate in Egypt 
outside the jurisdiction of the native courts and subject only to consular control. 
Many grew rich by smuggling opium and tobacco and invariably were protected by 
the foreign consuls... These foreigners, who were completely exempt from 
taxation, also served as agent in arranging for loans and contracts on extortionist 
terms. In 1873, for example, [Egyptian government] accepted a loan at the face 
value of £32 million, but after heavy commissions and discounts received only £9 
million‛.  
On the policy changes from mercantilism to overseas expansion that underlay 
British industrial supremacy, which Engels described as: ‚It was under the 
fostering wing of protection that the system of modern industry - production by 
steam-moved machinery-was hatched and developed in England during the last 
third of the 18th century. And, as if tariff protection as not sufficient, the wars 
against the French Revolution helped to secure England the monopoly of new 
industrial methods. For more than 20 years, English men-of-war [fighting ships] 
cut off the industrial rivals of England from their respective colonial markets, while 
they forcibly opened these markets to English commerce. The succession of South 
America colonies from the rule of their European mother countries, the conquest 
by England all French and Dutch colonies worth having, the progressive 
subjugation of India turned the people of all these immense territories into 
customer of English goods. England thus supplemented the protection she practised 
at home by free trade she forced upon her possible customers abroad; and thanks to 
this happy mixture of both systems, at the end of the war, in 1815, she found 
herself,... in possession of virtual monopoly fo the trade of the world‛ (Engels, 
1990:522). 
While in Britain the government fully supported the policies of modernisation 
and expansion of industries by promoting technology, raising productivity and by 
encouraging the efficient use of production during the early phase of 
industrialisation. Similar polices of active state support was applied later on in 
Germany and France to industrialise their countries. In all West European countries 
and later on in the US, Japan and South Korea the process industrialisation was 
fully supported by the state through tariff protection and active industrial policies. 
(List, 1966; Amsden, 2001) In contrast to this, in colonial India no such policies 
were adopted and no efforts were made to protect domestic industries. As a result, 
we found steady productivity decline with de-industrialisation and de-urbanisation 
in India and in other major Asian countries took place in the 18th and 19th centuries 
(Siddiqui, 1996; Baran, 1957). 
 
3. Decline or economic convergence between 1820 and 1950? 
The question arises why the developing countries economy began to decline in 
the early 19th Century? It is widely accepted that manufacturing sector plays an 
important role in raising overall productivity. Therefore, we need to examine what 
was their share of manufacturing output in the world’s economy in the first quarter 
in the 19th century? How did it change during the colonial period? In the 1820 
when Asia produced more than half of the world’s output, then their economies 
were not yet fully colonised by the European powers. Thereafter, the industrial 
revolution and colonialism had created imbalanced unequal world. 
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Asia had dominated in term of GDP as late as 1800 and it was largely to two 
populous countries namely China and India. They together accounted for 50% of 
the world population and 50% of the world GDP. Europe, Russia and Japan were 
far less important economically and their share in the world output was far from 
being dominant. In 1820, the South accounted for 60% of the global GDP and 74% 
of the worlds’ population. The per capita income of these countries was 85% of the 
global average of US$ 666 (in 1990 prices). China and India, the two largest 
economies, together accounted for nearly 50% global GDP and nearly 57% of the 
world’s population (Maddison, 2003). 
However, by the 1820, while the Asian population remained same but their 
share in the world GDP declined modestly. However, for the same period the 
European and Japanese share in the world GDP increased. Maddison estimation on 
population and output indicates that between 1820 and 1950 the ‘West’ share in the 
world population increased from one-fourth to one-third, while their share in the 
world output doubled from 37% to 73%, which was a game changer, and its 
consequences became far longer than initially envisaged (Maddison, 2003). For the 
same period (i.e. from 1820-1950) the ‘South’ share in the world population 
declined from three-fourth to two-third, but their share in the world GDP declined 
sharply from 63% to 27%. This transformation of the world economy happened in 
a short period of just 130 years. As a result their sharp decline, which led to the 
creation of new international division of labour, where the South was economically 
marginalised and the West managed to chart out a dominant positon for themselves 
(Anievas & Nisancioglu, 2015). 
Angus Maddison (2003; 1998) has estimated the long term changes in the world 
population and world income for selected years. His estimates are based on a 
specific method where international prices have been calculated to facilitate cross-
country comparisons. Maddison’s method is widely used and seems to provide 
comprehensive source of historical statistics. 
Table 1 provides evidence on the distribution of population and output in the 
world economy for selected years. The Table 1 is derived from Maddison data on 
GDP. Among the Asian countries China and India were prominent economies; the 
share of the GDP of Western Offshoots includes United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, and former USSR (ex-Soviet Union).  As indicated in the Table 
1 that the share of China and India together in world’s output was nearly 50% in 
1820, which declined sharply to 8.8% in 1950. In contrast to this, the share of 
Western Europe and Western Offshoots together in the world’s output rose 
dramatically from 24.8% in 1820 to 56.9% in 1950. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Population and GDP in the World Economy: 1600-1950 (in %) 
 World Population World GDP 
 1600 1700 1820 1900 1950 1600 1700 1820 1900 1950 
China 28.8 22.9 36.6 25.6 21.6 29.0 22.3 33.0 11.1 4.6 
India 24.3 27.3 20.1 18.2 14.2 22.4 24.5 16.1 8.6 4.2 
Africa 9.9 10.1 7.1 7.0 9.0 7.0 6.9 4.5 3.4 3.8 
Latin America 1.5 2.0 2.1 4.1 6.5 1.1 1.7 2.2 3.6 7.8 
Western Europe 13.3 13.5 12.8 14.9 12.1 19.8 21.8 22.9 34.2 26.2 
Western Offshoots 3.0 3.1 3.5 5.5 7.0 0.3 0.2 1.9 17.6 30.7 
Eastern Europe 3.3 3.1 3.5 4.5 3.5 2.8 3.1 3.6 5.2 3.5 
Former USSR 3.7 4.4 5.3 8.0 7.1 3.4 4.4 5.4 7.8 9.6 
Japan 3.3 4.5 3.0 2.8 3.3 2.9 4.1 3.0 2.6 3.0 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Maddison, 2003, 1998; Nayyar, 2013:13-15. 
 
Maddison estimates are also broadly supported by other estimation. For 
example, Bairoch (1983) estimated GNP for selected years of 1750-1950 and 
divided the countries into two groups – first group included Asia, Africa and Latin 
America and in the second group included Europe, Japan and North America. His 
estimates are based in 1960 US$ prices and adjusted for differences in PPP of 
currencies. Bairoch found that the share of the former group in the world GDP was 
69% in 1830, came down to 57.4% in 1860, which is higher than Maddison 
estimate of 63% in 1820 and 42.6% in 1870. Bairoch (1983) estimation for later 
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period that share of the developing countries further dropped to 38.3% in 1900 and 
33.5% in 1913. This figure is closer to Maddison 32.6% in 1900 and 29.6% in 
1913. Their share declined further to 30.2% in 1928 and 27.5% in 1950. This figure 
is very close to Maddison estimate of 29% in 1940 and 27.1% in 1950 (Maddison, 
2003). 
In short, the differences widened between developing and advanced economies 
from 1820 to 1950. The developing countries share in the world population 
declined from 65% to 52%, while their share in world GDP fell very substantially 
from 57% to merely 16% for the same period (Maddison, 2003). This was largely 
due to fall in the economies of China and India. Both countries share in world 
population fell from 56.7% to 35.8%, while their share in the world output fell 
dramatically from 49.1% to only 8.8% between 1820 and 1950 (see Table 1). This 
was catastrophic to both countries as these were the periods when they suffered 
European aggression and colonialism and famines.  
Japan share of the world economy did not change much and remained stable 
between 3-4% with Meiji Restoration in 1868, the country was able to improve 
economic and political positions in the Asia. In the beginning of the 20th, Japan 
emerged as a regional power in Asia and also escaped from colonisation in the 19th 
century and thus was able to chart out independent economic policies as a 
sovereign country (Siddiqui, 2015b). 
However, some studies have argued that Western Europe was already 
economically advanced and rich compared to Asia even before the industrial 
revolution. It is said that primarily due to technological progress (Landes, 1969). 
Kuznets study (1971) also supported such claim by mainly focusing that per capita 
product level in the developing countries in 1750s was lower than in the west 
Europe prior to industrialisation. It is further claimed that around 1750 income per 
capita in the west Europe was twice than in Asia. Contrary to these claims, Bairoch 
(1983) estimated the manufacturing sector in selected countries from 1750 to 1953. 
His work shows that in the 1750 the South (he described as the ‘Third World’) 
accounted for nearly three-fourths of the world’s industrial output. Their share 
declined to two-thirds in 1800 and three-fifths in 1830. However, the drastic fall of 
the developing countries was noted from 60.5% in 1830 to 20.9% in 1880 and 
further decline to 7.5% in 1913, while the advanced economies (Bairoch included 
Europe, North America and Japan) share in the world industrial output increased 
from 39.5% in 1830 to 79.1% in 1880 and 92.5% 1913. Bairoch study took into 
account levels of industrialisation in terms of volume of manufacturing production 
per capita. He found that the ratio of manufacturing production per capita in the 
South fell from 7:8 in 1750 to 3:4 in 1800, to 1:4 in 1860, 1:8 in 1880, 1:17.5 in 
1900 and 1:27.5 in 1930 (Bairoch, 1993:91). 
The distribution of manufacturing output is shown in Table 2. The data indicate 
that in 1750 73%of the manufacturing output was produced in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, while only 27% was then produced in Europe, North America and 
Japan. By 1830, the figure decline for the former group to 60.5%, while the share 
of the latter group rose to 39.5%. This trend continued and by 1953, the share of 
manufacturing output of Asia, Africa and Latin America in global output was 
merely 6.5%, while for Europe, North America and Japan it reached to 93.5% (as 
shown in Table 2).  
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Table 2. Distribution of Manufacturing Production in the World Economy, 1750-1953 (in 
%) 
Year Europe, North America and Japan Asia, Africa and Latin America World 
1750 27.0 73.0 100 
1800 32.3 67.7 100 
1830 39.5 60.5 100 
1860 63.4 36.6 100. 
1880 79.1 20.9 100 
1900 89.0 11.0 100 
1913 92.5 7.5 100 
1928 92.8 7.2 100 
1938 92.8 7.2 100 
1953 93.5 6.5 100 
Source: Nayyar, 2013: 25. 
 
Table 3 shows the GDP growth rates and also GDP per person for the periods of 
1820 to 1950. These figures are based on Maddison estimates of GDP growth and 
GDP per person, in 1990 US dollar by regions and countries for selected years. For 
Western Europe the growth rates in 1820-1870 was 1.68% annually which rose to 
2.2% then fell to 1.19% annually. Japan managed to raise GDP growth from 0.4% 
in 1820-1870 to 2.21% in 1913-1950, as shown in Table 3. However, the sharp 
decline was seen in the share of Asia in the world GDP for the same period. The 
growth performance for China and India for the periods of 1820-1870 to 1913-
1950 was worst compared to other regions as shown in the Table 3. The share of 
Africa in the world growth rate was slightly higher for the later period. The growth 
performance within the South group of countries was not all similar. For example, 
in contrast to Asia, the share of Latin America in the world GDP growth from 1870 
to 1950 had witnessed higher growth rates than even West Europe. It is because 
these countries were free and independently charted out their economic policies.  
In the Western Europe the spread of industrial revolution also led to the 
growing demands for capitalist forms of organisation of production in factories 
employing workers and constant drive to raise productivity through division of 
labour and technology. 
To understand levels of economic integration of the South with the North, we 
have to look at trade and investment. The data shows that exports from the South 
rose from $1.7 billion in 1900 to $7.9 billion in 1928 and again $15.4 billion in 
1948, while at the same time, imports also rose from $1.5 billion to $6.5 billion and 
$14.9 billion respectively. Measure to liberalise trade in the colony led to rapid 
growth of their trade (i.e. both exports and imports) between 1870 and 1913 
(Bagchi, 1984). 
 
Table 3. Growth Rates in the World Economy by Regions: 1820-1950 (in % per annum) 
 GDP GDP per capita 
 1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
The West       
West Europe 1.68 2.12 1.19 0.99 1.34 0.76 
Western Offshoots 4.31 3.92 2.83 1.41 1.81 1.56 
Eastern Europe 1.41 2.33 0.86 0.63 1.39 0.60 
Former USSR  1.61 2.40 2.15 0.63 1.06 1.76 
Japan 0.41 0.44 2.21 0.19 1.48 0.88 
The South       
China  -0.37 0.56 0.04 -0.25 0.10 -0.56 
India 0.38 0.97 0.23 0.00 0.54 -0.22 
Africa 0.75 1.32 2.56 0.35 0.57 0.90 
Latin America 1.22 3.52 3.39 -0.04 1.86 1.41 
Source: Nayyar, 2013: 22; Maddison, 2003, 1998. 
 
Moreover, a large proportion of trade from the South consisted of inter-sectoral 
trade, where primary commodities were exchanged for manufactured goods. 
Britain being highly advanced in manufactured goods and technology exported 
finished goods i.e. high value products, while imported raw materials i.e. low value 
commodities form its colonies in Asia and Africa. Another key element of the first 
period of globalisation is foreign capital investment. Here we find that stock of 
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foreign capital inflows into Asia, Africa and Latin America rose from $5.3 billion 
in 1870 to $11.3 billion in 1900, to $22.7 billion in 1914 and again to $24.7 billion 
in 1928 (Maddison, 2003). 
Both patterns of trade and capital investment show that from the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the colonies were integrated as suppliers of raw materials 
and markets for finished goods from Britain. Finally, the destruction of 
manufacturing sectors in Asia paved the way for expansion of markets for British 
finished goods in Asia. As Nayyar (2013:32) summarised it: ‚Between 1830 and 
1913, the share of Asia, Africa and Latin America in world of manufacturing 
production, attributable mostly to Asia, in particular China and India, collapsed 
from 60% to 7.5%, while the share of Europe, North America, and Japan rose form 
40% to 92.5%, to stay at these levels until 1950. The industrialisation of Western 
Europe and the de-industrialisation of Asia during the 19th century were two sides 
of the same coin. It led to the Great Specialisation, which meant that Western 
Europe, followed by the United States, produced goods while Asia and Latin 
America produced primary commodities‛. 
There was no reason why industrialisation and the development of capitalism 
would not have taken place a country like India if it was not colonised by Britain. 
For instance, the two most important industries, responsible for industrial 
development in the 19th century which took place with the discovery of steam, were 
namely railways and shipping. Prior to colonisation of Indian economy, we find not 
only textile industries were adversely affected, but also shipyards in Bombay. The 
shipyards were strangled by the British Registry Act, which place severe 
limitations on Indian shipping. There were no shortages of Indian technicians who 
would have learned the necessary skills at work and thus would have successfully 
improved their traditional skills. Karl Marx hoped that with the introduction of 
railways in India, they would become ‚truly the forerunner of modern industry‛. 
His optimism was based on the reasons because he viewed that trains could not 
operate ‚without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the 
immediate and current wants of railway locomotive‛ (Baran 1957). However, India 
did not reap the benefits Marx was hoping because nearly all of railways 
requirements were manufactured in Britain. As a result of such international 
changes not only had wide impact on the economies of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, but also transformed the economies of West Europe, North America and 
Japan. As Paul Baran (1957) pointed out that imperial power did not encourage a 
comprehensive industrialisation in their colonies and it was contrary to their 
economic and strategic interest to do so. Therefore according to him, the political 
and economic factors dominated by the colonialism and imperialism led to the 
creation of an unequal world.  
 
4. Theoretical discussions 
It is useful to revisit Adam Smith’s work on the issue of global inequality 
during the late 18th century. For Adam Smith (1937) the asymmetry among levels 
of development was because of the dynamic benefits of the international trade 
accruing disproportionately. However, Smith took optimist view about the 
prospects of global growth under a regime of perfect economic liberty. He 
emphasised initial conditions of absolute cost advantage, which can lead for some 
regions to devote more resources to manufacturing and others to agriculture. Smith 
also said that most advanced countries were those who had more extensive division 
of labour. He further said that the potential for productivity increase was greater in 
industry than agriculture. Adam Smith suggested that the application of most 
appropriate policy measures by the government could lead a country to develop 
more rapidly and also if they maintain appropriate internal securities and 
productivity incentives are taken then it will advance the process of capital 
accumulation and human capital development (Smith, 1937:18).   
In the mid-20th century again the question of global inequality was discussed 
and also how to find a solutions. It is being claimed that a rise in exports will 
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boosts growth and also induce productivity that would lead to lower prices and 
increased competitiveness. Another point being made is about the role of 
innovation and diffusion of technologies which is important as it can help 
industries in the developing countries in a number of ways such as to improve 
efficiency and productivity. Arthur Lewis (1954) said that in the long run economic 
performance is convergent and once surplus labour economy reaches its ‘turning 
point’, the wages will rise and profit rate will decline. To offset this scenario the 
capitalist either can import labour or export capital to other region where labour is 
surplus and can earn higher profits. Lewis argues that in a closed economy with the 
availability of surplus labour in the developing economies if the food sector 
productivity increases then it could slow down the growth of manufacturing sector. 
However, if an open economy, the rise in food sector productivity and will improve 
terms of trade of the exporters of the primary commodities. However, explaining 
structural dualism, Lewis model neglects the historical forces and the global power 
relations and also the role of global finance, capital flight, and industrial policy.  
In contrast to Lewis model, the Prebisch-Singer focused on monopoly power in 
trade and the movements in the terms of trade. They argued that the secular 
deterioration in the terms of trade for the developing countries is due to the 
advanced economies monopoly power in trade (Toye & Toye, 2003). Later on 
some emphasised on the growth and better economic performance, as Becker at al., 
(1990:S14) observes that, ‚Multiple steady states mean that history and luck are 
critical determination of a country’s growth experience. In our formulation, initial 
levels of human capital and technology, and subsequent productivity and other 
stocks, determine whether a country grows richer over time or stagnates at low 
income levels. Many attempts to explain why some countries and continents have 
had the best economic performance during the past several centuries give too little 
attention to accident and good fortune‛. All these important factors are totally 
missing from the neo-classical model. In fact, the role of Atlantic slave trade, 
slavery and the colonialism in Asia and Africa is the origin of the structural 
asymmetries that perpetuate inequality (Bagchi, 1984). It seems the historical role 
associated with the slavery, colonialism and economic control of resources by the 
West has been neglected by the neoclassical economists.   
In the 1980s, the lack of empirical evidence with neo-classical theory were seen 
when they failed to explain the causes behind the persistent in global inequality. 
Then the ‘North-South’ model was presented (where North was meant to be 
advanced and South as developing), which found the existing theories as 
inadequate to explain the causes of the global inequality. It was said that 
international trade based on competitive advantage rather than playing a positive 
role, having opposite affects with respect to achieving global equality. As Ronald 
Findlay (1984:222) argued, ‚I use the term ‚North-South‛ model to refer to any 
model in which there is some basic asymmetry related to the stage of development 
between two regions‛. He explained beyond the neo-classical paradigm of 
differences in factor endowments and tastes. It is important to note that the North-
South model explicitly identified the historical events including colonialism and 
military adventurism as the mechanism that shaped these structural dissimilarities. 
Such an approach does present broader perspective and explain the issues more in 
depth and logically. Therefore, we need to adopt a heterodox approach beginning 
with economic history for a comprehensive explanation and understanding of the 
gap between advanced and developing countries (Perkins, 2006). 
The neo-classical theory predicts that growth in the world trade would be able 
to reduce income disparities among the countries. Regarding international disparity 
we need to examine the neo-classical growth theories. The Solow model (1956) 
emphasises that when a poor country start out with lower levels of initial capital, 
returns to investment will be higher due to high marginal productivity of worker. 
Therefore, the rich countries will invest in poor countries, leading to a rise in 
capital generation. In short, Solow (1956) model predicts that with the adoption of 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(2), K. Siddiqui, p.266-291. 
277 
277 
trade liberalisation the poor countries will catch on growth with the rich countries 
(Siwach, 2016). 
 
5. Free trade 
The neoclassical economists have emphasised that free trade is the only option 
through which global poverty and inequality between countries could be removed. 
Trade and economic liberalisation have become a new mantra of the 21st century. 
The success of the East Asian economies and more recently Chinese upsurge in 
economic growth is largely said to be due to export-led policies and market 
reforms measures taken initially in 1978 (Siddiqui, 2009). However, a number of 
economists have disagreed with such propositions and according to them both 
liberalisation of the economy and state intervention to promote domestic businesses 
has had such positive outcomes also known as Chinese miracle (Stiglitz, 1989; 
Siddiqui, 2016a; Rodrik, 2011). 
Economic historians have concluded that free trade imposed by Europeans in 
the colonies semi-colonies have brought dramatic socio-economic changes both at 
national and international levels and facilitated a new form of international division 
of labour. The nationalists argument in Asian and African countries that the 
imperatives of ‘free trade’, whether imposed on China by gun boat or as on India 
by outright occupation, had a devastating effect. Longstanding Chinese business 
clans were important in spreading trade across South East Asia as bourgeoisie 
capitalists in Hamburg, London and New York. European domination over the 
worlds’ economy and people became obvious by the end of the 19th century a large 
part of the South and humanity had been converted into long term losers in the 
scramble for resources and dignity (Cain, 2006). However, to understand the whole 
truth of the ‘free trade’, we must analyse the experiences of the developing 
countries, especially of the 19th and first-half of the 20th century, when the present 
developing countries were European colonies and semi-colonies and ‘free trade’ 
policy was imposed on them (Siddiqui, 2018b).  
Britain imposed tariff duties into its domestic markets on imports of textiles 
cloths from India, while no such protection was provided to Indian textiles 
producers in India in the early 19th century. As a result, manufacturing collapsed 
and the urban population fell in India. For example, the population of Dacca, which 
was once great centre of muslin production, fell by 90% with in a very short 
period. Therefore, instead of exporter of textile and other industrial products, India 
began importing British textiles, and India’s export share of world markets fell 
from 27% in 1815 to 2% in 1840 (Maddison, 1998). 
Indian manufacturing in the early 19th century had the capability of 
successfully challenging the British textile, which was then the leading sector of 
the then British economy ‚take-off‛ into industrialisation (Siddiqui, 1990). The 
British government extended protection to their textile producers against imported 
textiles from India. For example, by 1814, Britain placed tariff of 70% to 80% on 
all imported textiles from India, as a result the Indian textiles became un-
competitive price wise in the British market i.e. became very expansive and hence 
out of the market. At the same time, colonial government did not introduce any 
tariff to protect Indian textiles, leading to flooding of British textiles into Indian 
markets. Because there were no tariffs against the export of raw cotton from India, 
hence as a result there was a dramatic rise of exports of raw cotton from India. The 
East India Company (i.e. the Company was exclusively owned by British 
shareholders) traders simply switched from buying Indian textiles to buying raw 
cotton and sell it to British markets. Despite having of locally available raw 
materials such as cotton, long experience and cheap labour, India no longer 
produced cotton textile products, but rather exported raw cotton and imported 
cotton textiles from Britain. The cotton products imported from Brittan increased 
from just 1 million yards in 1814 to 53 million yards in 1844. And also the number 
of Indian textile workers (spinners and weaver) fell from 6.3 million to only 2.4 
million between 1800 and 1911 (Bagchi, 1984). 
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Those countries which were able to escape direct colonisation, but still were not 
protected from the adverse effects of free trade treaties. In fact, such treaties then 
encouraged and made it profitable to produce and export raw materials. Low tariffs 
along with fall in shipping costs undermined the development of indigenous 
industries in Asia and Latin America to compete with Britain. For example, Egypt 
and Turkey both under British pressure drastically reduced import restrictions. As a 
result, Turkey’s textile imports rose dramatically after Britain signed a treaty with 
Turkey in 1838, according to which Turkey was forced to open up its economy and 
imports duties were brought down to maximum 5% (Rodrik, 2011). 
It is assumed that trade liberalisation will lead to income convergence between 
countries. Garima Siwach’s (2016) studied the effect of liberalisation on per capita 
income of 19 developing countries, which opened up their economies in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The study compared the trade effects on convergence rates by looking 
at the patterns of pre- and post-liberalisation. Such study of growth and 
convergence has a significant impact on long-term growth policies of an economy 
and also provides us implications for poverty, which is the most important policy 
the developing is seeking to address. Siwach (2016:118) concludes that ‚there is no 
significant change in convergence that can be attributed to trade liberalisation. 
Through a first difference analysis that estimates convergence rates between trade 
groups before and after liberalisation, we find no significant change in convergence 
for developing countries towards their major partners of trade. The results are 
robust when large country biases are taken care of as well‛. Moreover, the 
convergence theory also emphasises the flow of technology from the rich to the 
poor countries. There is no doubt that open trade leads to increased knowledge 
dissemination but this process needs to be accompanied by domestic polices such 
as infrastructure, education and institutional settings. As a number of studies have 
pointed out that trade liberalisation fosters spill over effects and raise productivity 
and income convergence in those countries that had invested in human capital 
including higher levels of literacy rates (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006; Siddiqui, 
2016b). 
Another study by Lant Pritchett argued that the gap between the rich countries 
such as the United States, UK, Germany and Japan and the world’s poorest states 
rose dramatically between 1870 and 1960, from a per capita income ratio of about 
nine in 1870 to more than fifty in 1960. However, he further said that since 1980s 
few poor countries have achieved higher growth rates than the rich countries; that 
is, they were converging rather than diverging. Pritchett (1996) estimated the time 
it would take for the poor countries, such as India, to become equal as rich ones. 
On India he said: ‚A few developing countries were actually converging, that is, 
they were growing faster than the United States. When are these lucky convergers 
going to overtake the United States? India, for example, registered an annual 
average growth rate of 3 percent between 1980 and 1993. If India could sustain this 
pace for another 100 years, its income would reach the level of high-income 
countries today. And, if India can sustain this growth differential for 377 years, my 
great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-grandchildren will 
be alive to see India’s income level converge‛ (Pritchett, 1996:42). 
Experiences show that no economy has grown at anywhere near an annual rate 
of 3 percent for 100 years, much less 377, this seems unlikely indeed. Even China, 
with its astonishing recent growth rates, which have lowdown since 2008 global 
financial crisis, will not be able to sustain such a rate for more than a century. Most 
poor countries are not converging, the two largest ones, namely China and India 
have experienced rapid growth rates and economic changes in recent decades. 
Incomes for hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians have risen dramatically, 
and because these nations have a combined population of 2.7 billion i.e. 37.5% of 
the world’s population. It appears that they count for much more than most nations 
in terms of national income. They alone account for the convergence and if we 
excluded them, there seems to be little evidence of convergence between rich and 
poor countries (Siddiqui, 2015c; Pritchett, 1996). 
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This means that developing countries should grow at faster rate than the 
advanced economies so that the inter-country inequality could decline over a 
period of time. It is said that developing countries have an advantage as they can 
exploit the already existing technology as they do not have to bear the cost of 
research as others have absorbed the costs (Perkins, 2006). It is also claimed that 
diminishing returns to factor inputs meaning that capital returns are higher in the 
developing countries and there is a large number of rural workers who are engaged 
in low productivity agriculture sector could be moved to higher productivity 
manufacturing and service sectors. The neo-classical economists put emphasis on 
trade relationships upon the assumptions that each participant in a market had 
sufficient resources to withdraw from the market if they did not agree on the prices. 
However, in this case, indebted peasantry had no such options i.e. been unable to 
withdraw from the colonial system (Alam, 1994).  
Karl Marx came to conclusion that without protective tariffs against England, 
there could be no economic development of Ireland. His earlier views on the role 
of ‘free trade’ were changed, as he wrote, ‚The system of protection was an 
artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers of expropriating independent 
labourers, of capitalising the natural means of production and subsistence, of 
forcibly abbreviating the transition from the medieval to modern mode of 
production‛ (Marx, 1992:708). In the late 1600s, Ireland, a British colony, was 
about to develop woollen industries. It was due to a number of factors including 
flow of skilled catholic immigrants from the Continent and availability of raw 
materials. However, English woollen producers saw this as a threat to their own 
woollen industry and they successfully petition the English king to prohibit all 
exports of woollen from Ireland in 1699. 
The economic development seems to have strong association with 
industrialisation i.e. with increasing share of country’s output and labour force 
involved in industrial sector. Wages also seems to be higher in the industrial sector 
than the agriculture sector because of the application of technology are greater in 
the former. It is assumed that with the expansion of industrial sector, the 
contribution of agriculture sector to the GDP both in terms of its share output and 
employment declines. Also it is said that surplus labour from agriculture would 
move to higher productivity industrial sector. As Amsden (2001:2) argues, 
‚economic development is a process of moving from a set of assets based on 
primary products, exploited by unskilled labour, to a set of assets based on 
knowledge, exploited by skilled labour‛. Also the experiences from the successful 
East Asian economies tell us that industrialisation has played an important role in 
reducing burden from agriculture and also it led to changes in their patterns of trade 
(Siddiqui, 2012). A modernised economy with expanding industrial sector is 
expected to increase the proportion of exports of manufacturing goods, while at the 
same time reduce the exports of primary commodities of their total exports. It will 
be replaced by greater diversification of the economy and exports will increase the 
proportion of manufacturing goods and services. It would also mean exports will 
consist of increased proportion of higher value products. 
This is achieved by the consistent government efforts to increase investment in 
education, skills and training of the labour force. Also require increased investment 
in infrastructure such as roads, ports etc. I mean to say that changes in the policies 
are needed. Barriers to change both internal and external must be dealt so that 
targeted polices could be achieved (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006). And also the gains 
in recent decades by the developing countries are taking place due to outsourcing 
of industrial production by the MNCs aimed at exploiting of low wages in these 
countries. 
The shift of manufacturing industries in recent decades from the advanced 
economies to the developing countries has made a huge impact and structural 
change in the economies of especially some East Asian countries. Despite the shift 
of industry to the south, the basic conditions of modernisation continue to hold 
almost monopoly in the development of most advance technology and new 
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products by the advanced economies led by largely their global companies. This is 
manifested in the inability of developing countries except China to catch up 
economically with the advanced economies. For example, from 1970 to 1989, the 
average annual per capita GDP of the developing countries, excluding China, was 
only 6% of the per capita GDP of the G7 countries (US, Japan, Germany, UK, 
France, Canada and Italy). Further for the period of 1990 to 2013, slightly declined 
to 5.6%. Moreover, for the forty-eight least advanced economies, the average 
annual per capita GDP as a share of that of G7 declined for the same period from 
1.5% to only 1.1% for the same period (UNIDO, 2016). 
 In the 1980, the share of world’s industrial employment of developing 
countries was 52%, which had risen to 83% by 2013. The share of worldwide 
inflows of foreign capital (i.e. FDI) into the developing countries also increased 
from 33% in 2000 to 51% in 2010 and further to 61% by 2014. (IMF, 2016) 
However, if China is included in the developing countries, the average annual per 
capita income of developing countries as a percentage of that G7 rises from 4.7% 
in the periods of 1970-1989 to 5.5% in 1990-2014 (IMF, 2016). 
Capitalism since mid-20th century could be categorised as following: The golden 
age of capitalism 1948-73; transition 1973-80; and neoliberalism 1980-? 
Capitalism at this stage of development requires further integration of global 
market and production activities to increase accumulation and by exploiting 
especially those regions which are less advanced or so far were not its domain. 
Globalisation appears to be the process of greater degree of economic activities 
among countries (Siddiqui, 1998). It includes of increased levels of goods and 
capital movements via international flow of goods and services. It also means of 
greater openness of the national markets and reliance on trade to achieve economic 
prosperity. Attempts were made to integrate economies could be divided into three 
periods.  
The first period (1870-1914) when tariffs were lowered among countries as a 
result of colonisation and reduction in transport costs. During this period rapid 
expansion of railways and telegraphs took place. This period also witnessed in an 
average increase in GDP growth of only 0.5% per annum. This was driven under 
the leadership and control of European countries and their businesses, as they 
increased their ownerships of resources and influence, to a very high degree 
compared to the past. During the first phase of globalisation only few European, 
North America and the ‘New World’ (white settlements colonies such as 
Argentina, Canada, Australia and New Zealand showed convergence among 
themselves, while the income difference between them and the rest of the 
developing countries were widened sharply. The most important thing occurred 
was the international division of labour, where colonial powers became the 
exporter of capital and technology, while the colonised countries became 
specialised in the production and supplier of primary commodities. 
During the first period both public and private investment has been meagre in 
the colonies, especially in agricultural sector such as in irrigation and technological 
progress to raise yields and raise land productivity. In India for example, 
Sivasubramonian (1960) and Blyn (1966) both in separate studies have found that 
the rate of increase of total agricultural output for the first half the 20th century was 
negligible. India had carried out three distinct policy measures to maintain income 
deflation on the Indian population. The first policy imposed was very high land 
rent charges, which gave phenomenon of so-called ‘drain surplus’ and the second 
was a deliberate attempt to undermine Indian manufacturing i.e. destruction of 
handicraft production which is known as de-industrialisation of the Indian 
economy and third by the import of industrial goods from Britain (Siddiqui, 1996). 
The second period (1945-1980) witnessed further decline in transport costs and 
increase in productivity in the West. International trade rose as the Western 
economies were progressively opened for trade and capital investment. We also 
find that the colonies became independent and assigned greater role for the state in 
the managing of the economy and undertook a policy domestic industrialisation, 
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with little attention was paid about the sources of financing. As a result, the 
economic growth increased, but soon faced financial crisis, while at the same time 
population was rising at higher rate than the pre-colonial period due to the greater 
availability of medicine and food. Growth of agricultural output increased much 
faster compared to pre-independent period. The state undertook a number of 
measures to protect farmers such as protecting them from world’s price 
fluctuations, provided subsidies on electricity, fertilizers, credits, public funds to 
research on the development of new seeds and also assured remunerative prices 
through public procurement of certain crops.  
The third period (1980 – beyond) witnessed increase integration of the global 
economy not only among the Western countries but also developing countries 
joining in via increased degree of trade and foreign capital investment. However, in 
the 1980s and 1990s most of the developing countries had to adopt neoliberal 
reforms imposed by the international financial institution such as the World Bank 
and IMF. These reforms were known as ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAP) 
due to their heavy borrowings in the 1980s and subsequently their inability to repay 
back loans, which resulted in debt crisis and macroeconomic imbalances. The 
adoption of SAP also included opening up their domestic markets for foreign 
goods, technology and capital. Some of the developing countries saw rapid 
structural change in their economies and increased production and export of 
manufacturing goods, especially the East Asian countries. However, for most of the 
developing countries the neoliberalism, which SAP is part of it, As Venugopal 
(2015) concludes that: 
‚This version of neoliberalism has a strong family resemblance to 
dependency theory in identifying logic of unequal power relations, blocked 
development and adverse incorporation in the global economy. Firstly, the 
very nature and dynamics of structural adjustment and conditionality-based 
development aid reflects and reproduces the deeply unequal and coercive 
relationship between rich and poor countries. Secondly it requires poor 
countries to implement self-destructive economic policies, including open 
door trade and investment regimes that results in de-industrialization and 
vulnerability to speculative financial flows. Thirdly, it pushes developing 
countries backwards in development to a colonial-era structure of primary 
commodity exports, locking them into a vulnerable and dependent position of 
enduring weakness‛ (Venugopal, 2015:176). 
 
6. Globalisation and economic liberalism 
The neoliberal policy which is characterised by the hegemony of international 
financial capital, where state acts as an entity that apparently stands exclusively 
with the interest of the corporate interests. Globalisation and neoliberalism seems 
aims to limit the developmental policy options of the developing countries, which 
are pushed aggressively by WTO and fully backed by the advanced economies. 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement has been 
in force since 1995 and it imposes a global standards for protecting and enforcing 
all forms of intellectual property rights (IPR), including those for patents. The 
TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to provide protection for a minimum 
term of 20 years for any invention for a product or process. Prior to TRIPS, 
countries provided only process and not product patents. Product patents provide 
for absolute protection of the product, whereas process patents provide protection 
in respect of the technology and the process or method of manufacture.  
The Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 produced the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). It aims to bring down investment barriers. 
The agreement supposed to ensure national treatment by removing domestic 
content provisions. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was 
signed in 1994. The agreement intends to remove any restrictions and internal 
government regulations in the areas of service delivery that are considered to 
‚barriers to trade‛. The strategy, for instance, is to transform education into a 
tradable commodity. GATS educational agenda has the potential to further 
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privatization to a higher level in education and also opening the door for 
international competition. The developing countries will be adversely affected in 
terms of their sovereignty on cultural policy and the quality and accessibility of 
their public education systems in general (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006, Wade, 2003). 
There three policy measures are: namely intellectual property rights (TRIPS), 
on investment measures (TRIMS), and trade in services (GATS) will limit the 
authority of the governments in the Developing countries. In fact, these regulations 
will expand the options of global companies operating in the developing countries. 
Most of the global companies are originated in the advance economies, which will 
benefit from the global market-opening by technology rent seeking. The structural 
change in the advanced economies of the last three decades, where the services 
began to dominate and hence to protect their interest became vital for the advance 
economies. The multilateral agreements pushed by the Uruguay Round will 
prevent the developing countries from pursuing any kinds of industrialisation or 
economic diversification policies as adopted by the East Asian countries (Siddiqui, 
2015a).  It is clear the in the global political economy where bargain and deals are 
struck where both sides are equally strong. Here it is not the case as the developing 
countries are the weak participants during the negotiations.  
The advanced economies is the net producers of patentable knowledge, while is 
the Developing countries is a net consumer, meaning the rent will flow from 
Developing countries to advanced economies. The proponents of TRIPS argue that 
higher profits acquired by the companies would lead to more investment in 
technology and innovation and ultimately consumers in the developing countries 
will benefit. However, such arguments ignore that investment and innovations 
depends on many factors including competitive environments and profits. Past 
experiences show that this is not always the case. Despite the fact that some 
assurances given to address humanitarian concerns in health areas, but no firm 
commitments on technology transfer and industrialisation in the developing 
countries. The GATS emphasises on trade in services including banks, public 
utilities such drinking water, sanitation, and education and so on. GATS require 
‘national treatment’, meaning all service companies must be treated as domestic 
companies. It means that developing countries will not be able to protect their 
domestic companies against well resources global companies. 
It appears that in the recent years the imposition of neoliberal economic reforms 
in the developing countries, especially highly indebted one, the withdrawal of state 
in the developing countries would make agriculture an economically unviable 
occupation for the large number of farmers, very different from the immediate 
post-colonial policies.  
As a result of two centuries of European control and domination of the South by 
1950 their total GDP share had shrunk to only 27%, while they still accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the world’s population. In 1950s, China and India together 
produced only 9% of the global GDP, with more than two-third of the world’s 
population. For instance, at the time of independence in 1947, Indian 
manufacturing accounted for only 7% of its GDP and only 2% of the labour force 
was employed in industries. In contrast, the advanced economies share of the 
global GDP rose rapid by 1950 and reached to more than double to nearly 70%, 
with a share of population on less than 28% (Siddiqui, 2010). 
The question arises did trade liberalisation played a role in reducing the inter-
country and international inequality? To understand this, we must look to what 
extent trade performance is linked to their growth performance. If we assume that 
growth in the world trade is an important determinant of trade performance then 
there is a need to analyse the cross country patterns of trade performance in order 
to understand fully the linkage to changes in inter-country and international 
inequality.  
The multilateral institutions such as IMF, World Bank and WTO have claimed 
that trade stimulate growth. Such conventional wisdom finds support among the 
neoclassical economists that trade promotes specialisation and allows realisation of 
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economies of scale due to increasing market size and facilitates global diffusion of 
technology.  
However, there is no clear empirical evidence to this theoretical proposition. 
Some studies have tried to test whether a higher trade GDP ratio is associated with 
a higher income per capita, but no consistent association is being found. The 
problem is that those countries with a large population of trade to GDP are also 
happened to be advanced economies (Ghose, 2004:238). Some other studies who 
have examined the relationship between trade liberalisation and growth, found that 
the indices to openness are difficult because trade openness does not always lead to 
more trade but also important factors are: trade promotion such as marketing and 
demands for exports (Edwards, 1998).  
A more comprehensive way to look at trade-GDP ratio and an increase in this 
ratio is interpreted as improvement in trade performance and vis versa. Then the 
question arises should we look at the growth of GDP or the growth of per capita 
GDP. The standard textbook approach would be trade affects change in per capita 
GDP. The increased trade raises factor productivity and the standard trade theory 
assumes full employment so that a rise in trade can affect growth only through 
factor reallocation. However, full employment does not exist in the developing 
countries. Once we withdraw this assumption then increased trade would lead to 
increase investment as openness to encourage capital flows. But it does not 
necessarily mean all capitals would be invested but some might be used in 
speculation and can encourage capital flight, which could have adverse effect on 
domestic investment.  
The adoption of trade liberalisation and the issue of trade performance, Ghose 
(2004:240-41) concluded, ‚serious analysis of the effect of trade liberalisation on 
trade performance, we should need to construct a measure of change in openness 
over the period for each of the countries and then study the relationship between 
this change and the change in trade performance…however, construction of 
appropriate indices of openness has proved extremely difficult, and much research 
is required…[in] the mid-1980s virtually all countries of the world implemented 
trade liberalisation policies. However, neither the initial trade regime nor the 
liberalisation policies were the same across countries…The effect of liberalisation 
on trade performance has been quite varied across countries…trade liberalisation 
had a more favourable effect on the growth performance of populous countries than 
on that of small countries‛. 
 
7. Catching up? 
The whole policies measures must be seen from the past developmental 
experience. In a similar situation in the past around mid-19th century when Britain 
manufacturers faced stiff competition from the then established companies of 
Holland. As then Friedrich List observed: ‚It is very clever common device that 
when anyone has attained the submit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by 
which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up 
after him… Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on 
navigation has raised her manufacturing power…can do nothing wiser than to 
throw away ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free 
trade …‛ (List, 1966:368). 
The GDP per capita in developing countries rose from $209 in 1970 to $947, 
and $3715 in 2014, while as proportion of GDP per capita in the West decreased 
from 7.3% in 1970 to 4.9% in 1990, but increased to 9.4% in 2014. In fact, in the 
last four decades, GDP per capita in the developing countries as a ratio of that in 
industrialised countries rose from 1:13.6 in the 1970 to 1:10.6 in 2014. The 
population in the developing countries increased to more than double from 2.7 
billion in 1970 to 5.7 billion in 2014 (IMF, 2016; Siddiqui, 2016c). 
The growth rates of the advanced and developing economies from 1990 to 
2015. The figure shows that between 2002 and 2007 both advanced and developing 
economies accelerated. But the growth sharply declined after the global financial 
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crisis of 2008. Thereafter, the economies of both groups rose briefly in 2010, but 
soon witnessed slow down again. In the early 2000s the US economy experienced 
rapid growth, which was driven by availability of consumer debt, primarily 
housing markets and other consumer durables. It was driven by finance bubble, 
when the government lifted on bank regulation and they were encouraged to be 
innovative. The US economic boom in the early 2000s boosted demands for goods 
and capital from abroad. However, such situation could not continue forever. The 
boom of the mid-2000s initiated by the finance only was able to build 
unsustainable bubble, while at the same time wages were stagnated and inequality 
widened. This led to the realisation problems i.e. what Keynes called lack of 
aggregate demand (Siddiqui, 2017b).  
After the global financial crisis most of the advanced economies followed 
expansionary fiscal policies, but this was discarded as soon as the economy began 
to pick up and the crisis thought to have been managed. And again the advanced 
economies reversed back to neoliberal dogma that monetary policy should a 
preferred instrument and the reduction in interest rates was expected to restore the 
confidence in the economy and encourage investment and growth. Moreover, the 
monetary policy tend to be rather limited, especially focused on ‘quantitative 
easing’ and claimed that zero interest rates would provide cheap credits to 
investors, but same time purchasing power to those sections whose marginal 
propensity to consumption is known to be higher, were denied with welfare cuts 
and wages stagnation. In developing countries the credit bubbles were created in 
response to 2008 crisis and declining demands for their exports. The credits to 
GDP ratio and non-performing loans have risen sharply since 2010 global 
economic crisis.  
Figure 1 shows the share of advanced economies in global GDP at current US 
dollar prices. The data shows that share of advanced economies have declined from 
83% in 1988 to 60% in 2016, which is a substantial decline. First of all, this has 
occurred in a relatively short period of 2002 to 2014. 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of advance economies in global GDP (in % at current $ prices at market 
exchange rates) 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2016, IMF database. (accessed on 25 June 2017). 
 
Figure 2 indicates annual GDP growth in the developed and developing 
economies from 1990. The period from 2002 to 2007 does show acceleration of 
growth across economies, but that came to end in the collapse of 2008-09, and 
since then GDP growth rates have been similar to those of the 1990s. 
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Figure 2. GDP Growth Rates from 1990 to 2015. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2016 database. (accessed on 22 June 2017). 
 
Table 4 and 5 show the per capita GDP growth of the developed and developing 
economies from 1978 to 2015. Here again we find China is on the top of the list 
with average annual growth of 7.4% and the growth compared to US is estimated 
to be 461%.  
 
Table 4. Per Capita GDP – fastest growing economies from 1978 to 2015 
  1978 – 2015* 
Rank Country Total increase 
1978-2015 
Average annual 
growth 
Growth compared to 
United States 
1 China 1,396% 7.4% 461% 
2 Myanmar 660% 5.2% 326% 
3 South Korea 632% 5.1% 319% 
4 Taiwan 566% 4.8% 299% 
5 Vietnam 484% 4.4% 272% 
6 Thailand 443% 4.1% 256% 
7 India 431% 4.0% 251% 
8 Sri Lanka 430% 4.0% 251% 
9 Singapore 418% 3.9% 246% 
10 Cambodia 394% 3.8% 235% 
11 Hong Kong 382% 3.7% 230% 
12 Malaysia 369% 3.6% 224% 
13 Indonesia 346% 3.4% 213% 
14 Chile 330% 3.3% 204% 
15 Mozambique 293% 2.9% 184% 
For comparison 
39 United States 180% 1.6% 100% 
Note: *Calculated in Parity Purchasing Powers of 2011 converted to 2014 pirces. 
Source: Calcualted from the Conference Board Total Economy Database 2015; World Bank, 2016. 
 
Table 5. Total per capita GDP growth in advanced economies, 1978-2015 
Country Total 
growth 
1978-2015 
Annual 
average 
growth 
Growth 
rate as % 
of China 
1978 – per 
capita GDP as 
% of China 
2015 – Per 
capita GDP as 
% of China 
Japan 182% 1.6% 22% 2,078% 275% 
Germany 177% 1.6% 21% 2,625% 340% 
UK 189% 1.7% 23% 2,123% 298% 
France 156% 1.2% 16% 2,465% 286% 
US 180% 1.6% 22% 3,010% 404% 
China 1,396% 7.4% - - - 
Note: * Calculated in Parity Purchasing Powers of 2011 converted to 2014 pirces. 
Source: Calcualted from the Conference Board Total Economy Database 2015; World Bank, 2016. 
 
Figure 3 shows the changing share of the GDP of the major developing regions. 
Here China is plotted separately to show its growing economic share. China’s share 
in the global GDP rose from 3% to 15% between 2005 and 2016. This was time 
when China’s share of the global GDP at market exchange rate rose rapidly to ten 
percentage points. In fact, such a rapid change in China’s share alone explains 87% 
of the entire decline of the advanced economies for the period of last thirty-five 
years. Figure 3indicates the changes in share largest Asian developing economies 
excluding China. We find India’s share in the global GDP has been the largest and 
its share increased from 1.8% in 2005 to 3% in 2015. However, it is much less than 
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China, whose share is three times of India’s aggregate share. Indonesia and South 
Koreas share in the global GDP has increased (Siddiqui, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 3. Share of developing regions in global GDP (Current US $ prices at market 
exchange rates) 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2016, IMF database. (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
 
However, if we exclude China then the share change of other regions provide us 
a different picture. For example, the Latin American region in the 1980s had 
experienced a decline, which is also known as lost decade. The region’s economies 
recovered in the 1990s and early 2000s. Their share in global GDP rose by 5% in 
2003 to 8% in 2011, but thereafter again began to decline. The Middle East 
countries had experienced a rise in the share due to largely high oil prices, but for 
the last 2 years due to collapse in oil prices, its share in the global GDP has fallen. 
The sub-Saharan Africa had a long period of stagnation and economic decline i.e. 
from 1980 to 2002 and since then their share in the global GDP has slightly gone 
up to 1.1% in 2002 to 2% in 2015. However, its share in global GDP is still below 
compared to its 1980s share of 3%. In short, among the developing regions, only 
Asia’s share to global GDP is rising. Due to on-going global recession in the 
advance economies, the BRICS countries too are facing slowing down economic 
growth rates and declining their export markets (Siddiqui, 2016c).  
Soon after independence the developing countries saw that industrialisation in 
imperative towards removal of backwardness, to increase productivity and to 
diversifying of its economy. For this task nearly all the developing countries 
adopted import substitution policies in the manufacturing sector. International trade 
increased after the 1950 in the developing countries.  
The exports from the developing countries rose from $20 billion in 1950 to 
$600 in 1980 and nearly $6400 billion in 2010, but imports rose rapidly as well. 
The developing countries share in the world exports was 34% in 1950, fell to 19% 
in 1970, 24.2% in 1990, rose to 31.9% in 2000 and 42% in 2010, while their share 
of imports in the world economy was 29.6%, 18.5%, 23.1%, 28.8% and 38.9% 
respectively. The sharp rise since 2000 appears to be due to China’s rising trade 
(UNCTAD, 2016). 
The volume of international trade in goods has increased sharply for the last 10 
years (Figure 4a). The developing countries as a group have almost doubled the 
volumes of trade in goods since 2009. But import volumes have been growing 
relatively more than export volumes for developing countries. However, the 
opposite has happened in regard to developed countries. The relatively larger 
increase in the volumes of imports can be explained by the increase in consumer 
demand in developing countries. Growth in trade volumes has slowed down 
substantially in the last few years, especially in regard to developing countries. In 
2015, volume growth was negative in the case of China, both in relation to imports 
and exports (Figure 4b).  
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Figure 4. Volumes of International Trade in Goods 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTADStat data. Key Statistics and Trends in 
International Trade, 2016. Accessed on 20 April 2018. [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Values of trade in goods and services by region 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNCTADStat data. Key Statistics and Trends in 
International Trade, 2016. Accessed on 20 April 2018. [Retrieved from]. 
 
Developed countries' relative importance as suppliers in international markets 
has declined, but they still account for about half of the value of exports of goods 
and about two thirds of exports of services. In 2015 developed countries' exports of 
goods was about US $8 trillion (Figure 5a), while that of services added up to 
about $3 trillion (Figure 5b). In 2015, developing countries' trade sum up to about 
$8 trillion in regard to goods and about US$2 trillion in regard to services. In 2015 
BRICS exported about US$3 trillion in goods and about US$500 billion in 
services. Less developed countries contribution to world trade remains minimal, 
although some increases in exports and imports of these countries have been 
recorded over the past decade (UNCTAD, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 6. Investment Rates of the Advanced and Developing Economies, 1990 -2015 
Source: IMF Economic World Outlook, 2016. April database (accessed on 22 June 2017). 
 
As the Figure 6 indicates, the investment in the developing countries increased 
significantly since 2000s. Investment rose rapidly in a large developing economies 
like China, gave impetus to other economies. However, crisis and stagnation in the 
West stagnated global demands did not rise and adversely affected the developing 
economies. Once due to global financial crisis the supply liquidity dried up as 
capital rushed back to the advanced economies.  
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The manufacturing employment fell in the advanced economies between 1970 
and 2013. (See Figure 7) Across the developing countries, there were different 
experiences. For instance, the employment in manufacturing sector rose from 9.5 
% in 1970-74 to 19.4% of the total employment in 2010-13 and in the south Asia 
the manufacturing rose from 9.0% to 12.2% for the same period. In contrast to this, 
in Latin America and Africa it fell during the same period. 
 
 
Figure 7. Manufacturing Employment share of total employment, worldwide, 1970-2010 
Source: [Retrieved from]. Accessed on 16 June 2017. 
 
After 1950s there was a wide range of debate about the industrial policies, 
whether the state should play a leading role or it should be left on market forces. 
Since 1990 most of the developing countries have adopted for greater role of 
market forces. The neoclassical economists (i.e. also known as mainstream) 
opposed the state intervention (Little, et al., 1970). They argued that state 
intervention in the market for high costs, inefficiency and lower growth rates such 
as India and other Latin American countries. They opposed import substitution 
policies and proposed openness, increased reliance on market forces and 
competition was seen to achieve efficiency and higher growth. To achieve it trade 
and outwards-looking policies were seen only option left to the developing 
countries.  Despite the fact, the past colonial policy of free trade and excessive 
reliance on market forces had disastrous consequences, which initiated de-
industrialisation during the second half of the 19th century. Moreover, after the 
1950s the developing countries adopted protection policy towards domestic 
industries and import substitution policies resulted increase in industries and 
growth in manufacturing output, which was far better performance then seen in 
previous decades (Little, et al., 1970). 
 
8. Conclusion 
The study finds that during the last three decades, there have been huge 
economic changes taking place globally and structural changes and patterns of 
trade have also taken place both in advance and developing countries. However, 
some developing countries have achieved faster growth rates than the advanced 
economies, particularly China, India, Indonesia and Turkey. However, they 
constitute a small numbers among the developing countries, but accounts large 
number of its population. In fact, international inequality in terms of distribution of 
per capita incomes among the countries’ population has declined in the last two 
decades. Trade liberalisation and with the removal of trade barriers did have some 
positive impact on country’s growth but not all the developing countries have 
benefitted from it. We also find that with globalisation, transnational companies 
largely from the advanced economies driven by competition at home for markets 
(Siddiqui, 2017d) and higher wages and low returns, driven rising completion for 
markets, seeking to cut their costs have started investing abroad and supported by 
the rise of global value chains since the 1990s. 
Since their independence, in the 1950s and 60s, the developing countries share 
has risen and by 2010 their total share is over 42%, double than in the 1970. 
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Industrial sector in the developing countries is also increasing and their share of 
value added in global manufacturing output increased from 13% in 1970 to more 
than 40% by 2010. Moreover, the share of manufactures in developing countries 
exports rose from 12 % in 1980 to 63% by 2010, nearly half of this consisted of 
medium and high technology products. Another key development has been the rise 
of services in their export components of the developing courtiers such as 
information technology and e-commerce.   
As the Chinese economy is ‚catching up‛ fast and also Indian economy, both 
are re-emerging as most rapid growing economies and also major contributor to 
overall world’s output growth in 21st century. The two countries only in the recent 
past were only known as marginal economies, but now China has become as the 
second largest economy after the US, which is a remarkable development of the 
21st century. However, the global GDP share of Latin America has marginally 
increased to 8% between 1970 and 2010, while for Africa has remained same i.e. 
less than 3% for this period. Africa’s share in manufacturing value added in 2011 
was only 2%, as it was in 1970.  
Moreover, the widening gap between rich and poor countries seems to be the 
dominant features of the modern history. The Economist (2014) insist that it would 
take developing countries as a group (excluding China) more than a century or 
even longer period as three centuries to catch up with the income levels of the rich 
countries. The average life expectancy in the developing countries has risen in 
recent decades, but still in the sub-Saharan Africa it is only 56 years compared to 
78 years in the United States. It appears that the Western world is punching too far 
above its weight which could the main root of on-going crisis. The future cannot be 
just extension of the past. More needed to be done in the developing countries, 
especially those who still have widespread poverty in terms of economic policies 
and it may involve structural change. Todays’ advanced economies did not attain 
that status naturally and overnight, but they formed polices and worked 
consistently to achieve those goals.  
The study concludes that colonisation left a huge devastation not just in their 
economies but social and political impact which had lasting impact. Their 
economies fell behind until mid-20th century. However, after they became 
independent, their economies began to witness higher growth rates than previous 
decades. Almost all the Asian counties soon after independence adopted ambitious 
drive towards industrialisation, where state played a leading role. However, the 
poorest countries have not been able to converge and largely the two largest ones, 
namely China and India have experienced rapid growth rates and economic 
changes in recent decades. 
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